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Surprise Attack:
Crime at Pearl Harbor and Now (Part II)
This is the concluding portion of Judge Robinson's discussion of
the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, signed at The
Hague in 1907 (the "Third Hague Convention"), and its impact upon
the 1948 Tokyo war crimes trial. Judge Robinson was United States
counsel and naval legal officer in charge of the Pearl Harbor phase
and other parts of the Tokyo trial. The first portion of his article
appeared in the September issue of the Journal, beginning at page 973.
by James J. Robinson * Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom of Libya
THE INTERNATIONAL Military
Tribunal for the Far East was estab-
lished by proclamation in January,
1946, by General Douglas MacArthur
as Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers.3 6 In the following month the
General appointed to the court eleven
judges from nominations made by the
governments of the eleven participating
nations and peoples. 57
Prosecution counsel and staff, with
a total of seventy-two lawyers, likewise
were provided at Tokyo by the eleven
countries.5 8 Defense counsel consisted
of seventy-nine Japanese lawyers and
twenty-five experienced American de-
fense lawyers. The latter were provided
by the United States in response to a
request made by the Japanese authori-
ties to General MacArthur.5 9
The main court building was the
former War Ministry building. It in-
cluded parts of the former Japanese
military academy. It was headquarters
of Prime Minister War Minister-
General Tojo during the war. The
building was near Asakusa Palace, a
residence for royal guests which, with
its extensive gardens, rivalled royal
palaces of Europe. Nearby also were
Meiji University, its impressive mu-
seum and its huge modern baseball
stadium. At the stadium, many court
personnel, especially American and
Japanese, attended Japanese college
championship baseball games during
court recesses. Situated on a high hill,
the court building commanded from its
roof a distant view of snow-capped
Mount Fuji to the westward, some-
times sharply outlined against the great
red circle of the setting sun. To the
eastward there was a far view of tall
business buildings in downtown Tokyo,
of the dome of the Diet (Parliament)
Building, and of the Emperor's palace
grounds surrounded by ancient moats.
IV
The Trial and the Sentences
The trial of the indictment, filed
with the Tribunal in April, 1946, by
the counsel representing the eleven
countries, began on May 3, 1946, and
ended with the completion of delivery
of judgment and the sentencing of con-
victed defendants on November 12,
1948.60 In the trial about 500 wit-
nesses testified in open court. More
than 5,000 documents were introduced
in evidence. The transcript of the trial,
which has not been printed, is about
50,000 pages in length, and the total
record with exhibits exceeds 500,000
pages.
In the courtroom there were many
dramatic incidents, which need not be
narrated here. American Marine, Navy,
Army and civilian survivors of Japa-
nese Navy and Army atrocities, such
as the Wake, Palawan, and Nicollet 6 1
massacres, testified about what they
saw and heard and how they escaped
these mass killings of their comrades.
The evidence of these atrocity murders
and the testimony of nationals of many
other nations about hundreds of other
violations of the laws of war fill many
pages in the transcript and judgment.
Some of the defendants chose to testify.
56. Judgment, I.M.T.F.E., Annexes, page 16,
Special Proclamation Establishment of I.M.T.
F.E.
57. See Keenan and Brown, CRiMEs AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950) 28.
58. Statistical Report of Secretary General,
I.M.T.F.E., Tokyo, 1948.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. (Wake) Transcript, pages 14,911-967;
15,046. Judgment, pages 1,133-134. (Palawan)
Judgment, page 1,040. (Nicollet) Judgment,
page 1,074.
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They and other defense witnesses testi-
fied at length in reply to prosecution
evidence. Of the defendants who testi-
fied, former Foreign Minister Togo
made a strong impression of integrity
and independence of character. He
showed rare courtroom courage when
he testified in contradiction of Admiral
Nagano and Admiral Shimada regard-
ing their efforts to make the Pearl
Harbor attack a total surprise attack,
and their "threat" to him to keep him
from so testifying against them at the
trial.
Another defendant who testified, the
former concurrent Prime Minister,
War Minister and Commanding Gen-
eral Tojo, nicknamed "Razorbrain" by
the Japanese, impressed one as the
competent and sincere personification
of Japanese militarism. In the days
when the Japanese Foreign Office had
been trying to deal with continuous
protests by foreign nations against
the Japanese militarist lawlessness,
Tojo was reported to have summed up
the situation by saying, "We [the
Army] act; then we let the Foreign
Office explain!"
We lawyers at the lectern, while ad.
dressing the bench or questioning wit-
nesses, faced the eleven judges who
had been appointed from the eleven
countries whose flags were displayed
from the high staffs that were massed
behind the judges. In the central seat
on the bench was the president, or
Chief Justice, Webb of Australia. To
the lawyer's right, in order from the
president, were Judges Mei, of China;
Zaryanov, of the Soviet Union; Ber-
nard, of France; Northeroft, of New
Zealand; and Jaranilla, of the Philip-
pines. To the left in order were Judges
Cramer, of the United States; Patrick,
of Great Britain; McDougall, of Can-
ada; Roling, of The Netherlands: and
Pal, of India. All were in black robes
except the American member and the
Soviet member; they wore their Army
uniforms with the stars of major
generals.
A court is judged finally by the
fairness, the truth and the law in the
judgments which it hands down.
A judgment is to a case at law what
a peace treaty is to a war. It is the
end. It records the contest and the
results. It lays down the determined
facts. It makes changes of the past and
present. It makes provisions for the
future. It applies the dominant or-
ganized public force and governing
principles of the law specifically to
individuals and to groups of individ-
uals even up to nations.
If the reader was in the courtroom
at Tokyo on the afternoon of Novem-
ber 12, 1948, he saw and heard the
president of the court, Chief Justice
Webb, of Australia, finish reading the
judgment of the court, as described
above, and then sentence each of the
defendants in accordance with the judg-
ment. The chief justice had begun
reading the 1,200-page judgment on
November 4.
Facing the bench of judges and
about forty feet across the courtroom
were the twenty-five defendants. They
were seated at two tiers of tables in
their box enclosed by a low railing.
Behind the defendants, covering much
of the wall at the rear of the box, was
a color chart of Pearl Harbor showing
United States naval vessels as moored
when attacked on December 7, 1941.
The chart was there where I had intro-
duced it in evidence during the trial.
Military police of the United States
Army were stationed in the box, at the
entrances and elsewhere in the court-
room. In fairness it should be men-
tioned that the defendants conducted
themselves throughout the trial with
such order and dignity that they gave
the police no difficulty whatever. In
turn they were treated with due respect
by prosecution counsel. There was the
usual courtrooni courtesy, with no act
or word of personal indignity or venge-
ance.
Back of the visitors' section were
several glass-enclosed booths for the
interpreters. The booths were in two
tiers or levels rising well up toward
the high ceiling. In these booths the
interpreters were making simultaneous
interpretations of the spoken proceed-
ings. Each person in the courtroom
wore an IBM telephone headset. He
could hear the amplified original pro-
ceedings on this afternoon the chief
judge reading in English or, by turn-
ing a switch, he could hear the inter-
pretation in Japanese or another lan-
guage.
Judge Webb, delivering the judg-
ment, read [he court's verdict in the
case of each defendant. In the verdict
on Tojo, the judge read, as its conclu.
sion, these words:
He bears major responsibility for
Japan's criminal attacks upon her
neighbors. In this trial he defended
all these attacks with hardihood, alleg-
ing . . . self-defense. [That plea] is
wholly unfounded. The Tribunal finds
Tojo guilty on Counts 1, 27, 29, 31, 32
and 33; and under Count 54; not
guilty on Count 36 ... no finding under
Count 55.62
The guilty counts principally
charged, as the crime, "conspiracy to
wage aggressive war" and "waging ag-
gressive war".
After a short recess, during which
the defendants had been withdrawn
from the courtroom as usual, each de-
fendant was returned separately for
sentence. To Tojo, standing for sen-
tence in the defendant's box across the
courtroom, Judge Webb said,
Accused Tojo, Hideki, on the counts
of the indictment on which you have
been convicted, the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East sen-
tcnces you to death by hanging.6 3
Then Tojo, his face calm behind his
round shell-rim glasses, bowed to the
court with military precision, turned
sharply and strode with the military
police guard out through the rear door-
way near the large wall chart of Pearl
Harbor. For the last time he was leav-
ing the courtroom which had once
been part of his headquarters while he
was military and political dictator of
Japan.
The Tribunal sentenced seven de-
fendants to death, sixteen to imprison-
ment for life, one to imprisonment for
twenty years and one to imprisonment
for seven years. The review by General
MacArthur of the trial records and
sentences, as provided by the charter
of the Tribunal, did not result in
changes in the death sentences. The
seven condemned were executed on
December 23, 1948.04 With respect to
the defendants sentenced to imprison-
ment, releases in due course and
deaths have taken place since then so
62. Judgment, page 1,207.
63. Judgment, page 1,217.
64. Keenan and Brown, op. cit., page 3.
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that none of the defendants is now
serving sentence.
No defendant was sentenced, and
none had been indicted, for any act
done in lawful obedience to a superior
or in due performance of his military,
naval or governmental duties. For ex-
ample, Admiral Fukudome was not
indicted although, as he says in a pub-
lished article. he was known to have
been second only to the deceased chief
planner, Admiral Yamamoto, in top
Japanese naval planning for the Pearl
Harbor attack.
The tribunal and its work have re-
ceived commendation and also some
adverse criticism. 66, The comments will
provide useful information for future
court planners. The Soviet prosecution
counsel Vasilyev has charged that the
court permitted American defense
counsel to delay the trial to an "un-
believable" degree.67 He declares that
the judges should have been more ac-
tive in control of the trial and that
they should have worked harder and
with better organization to make the
trial rapid as well as just. These criti-
cisms appear to the writer not to tell
the whole balanced story.
The Soviet lawyer, a competent law-
yer like his colleague Dr. Golunsky,
in spite of his criticisms concludes that
"the court was able to reach a correct
decision". He writes also:
It is difficult to overemphasize the pre-
ventive significance of the sentence and
its role in exterminating aggressive
tendencies ill the social and political
life of an aggressive state. People who
have suffered from aggression await
impatiently the sentencing of those re-
sponsible for their sufferings.
6 I
A final comment on the court and
its work came from a group of re-
spected and competent Japanese de-
fense counsel. They called on me at the
Imperial Hotel in Tokyo on a January
morning in 1949 to say farewell. Their
spokesman said,
"We are grateful for the war crimes
trial. In the first place, the trial
brought to us our first knowledge of
the methods of our militarists in sub-
verting our former constitutional gov-
ernment. We learned also about their
atrocities. Secondly, the trial showed
us how criminal trials are conducted
in democratic countries. We saw how
Chief Justice Sir William Webb (top center) Australian member of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and President of the
court, reads the judgment of the court.
hard the court made you prosecutors
work to carry the burden of proving
the defendants guilty. In Japan the
defendant has had the burden to prove
himself not guilty. This situation will
be different under our new Constitu-
tion and criminal code."
I replied that my three years of
experience with Japanese lawyers and
judges in the international rial and in
Japanese courts had strengthened my
belief that it would have been fortu-
nate if there had been a Japanese judge
on the International Tribunal for the
trial. The legal result, I added, would
no doubt have been the same, but there
would have been equal justice in such
a recognition of the legal ability and of
the judicial impartiality of Japanese
lawyers and judges.
V
The Judgment and the Law
What is the law in the judgment
with respect to Hague III?
65. Fukudome, op. cit., page 3.
66. Vasilyev, Rapid Trial and Punishment of
War Criminals (on Results of Tokcyo Trials),
SovarsicoYE GOSDAaSTVv I PRAVO (Soviet State
and Law) March, 1949, pages 40-49.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
Hague Convention III was part of
the legal foundation of fifty of the
fifty-five counts in the indictment. In
forty-five of these fifty counts defend-
ants were charged with violating
Hague III and other treaties. Hague
III was the only statutory part of the
legal foundation of the remaining five
of the fifty counts. It was supple-
mented by the common law of war.
In these five counts, one of which was
the Pearl Harbor murder count previ-
ously referred to, certain defendants
were charged with killing human be-
ings by the surprise attacks which they
caused to be made in violation of
Hague III. The killings were charged
therefore to be criminal killings con-
stituting murder. 69
The court did not reject this view.
To reject the view would have been
in effect to nullify Hague III. The
court decided however to base the con-
victions of the defendants upon broad-
er, all-inclusive counts, as in the Tojo
69. The legal position is well presented by
Lord Wright in NEW YORx TIMES, Letters to
Editor, June 30, 1946. In the Judgment, page
36, the Court does not show full recognition of
the point but instead includes "initiating" war
under "waging" war. The point is developed in
Robinson, op. cit., note 43.
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verdict, which charged that the defend-
ants "waged wars of aggression". The
court stated in its judgment that
The waging of such wars [of aggres-
sion] is the major crime, since it in.
volves untold killings, suffering and
misery. No good purpose would be
served by convicting any defendant of
that major crime and also of "murder"
eo nomine. Accordingly it is unneces-
sary for us to express a concluded
opinion upon the exact extent of the
obligation imposed by Hague Conven-
tion III of 1907. It undoubtedly im-
poses the obligation of giving previous
and explicit warning before hostilities
are commenced. ..70 [Italics added.]
The judgment, therefore, expressly
recognizes Hague III to be the law at
this time, "undoubtedly" imposing the
legal duty or legal obligation not to
make a surprise attack. Furthermore,
the court did not dismiss any one of
the fifty counts that had Hague III as
a statutory part of its legal founda-
tion. On the contrary, the court dealt
with these counts with full respect for
Hague III as having legal standing
and validity. The court, moreover,
quotes with approval the statement in
the Nuremberg judgment that it would
be "unjust" not to punish those "who
in defiance of treaties . . . have at-
tacked neighboring states without
warning.. "71.
Thirteen counts charging murder, in-
cluding the five niurder counts referred
to above, were expressly left standing
by the court as "unnecessary to deter-
mine". 72 The court said that by such
action "we do not question the validity
of the charges".
The court at Tokyo, like the court
at Nuremberg, 72  based conviction
principally on "waging aggressive
war". Neither court defined that of-
fense. Neither court based the offense
exclusively on a certain treaty or trea-
ties. With respect to Hague III and the
Tokyo judgment, nevertheless, Hague
III is recognized by the judgment as
creating and forbidding the crime of
surprise attack which the judgmenL
includes in the offense of "waging ag-
gressive war"; and the judgment in-
cludes killings committed in surprise
attack in violation of Hague III as
criminal killings-part of the "untold
killings" involved in the offense of
waging aggressive war.7 4
Lawyers in some instances have ex-
pressed regret that the Nuremberg and
Tokyo courts did not base convictions
on specific treaties such as Hague III,
instead of relying broadly on the un-
defined offense of "waging aggressive
war". Some critics assert that the
Nuremberg court violated the ex post
facto rule,75 On the other hand, some
writers on international law have sup-
ported the court and have predicted a
useful future for the offense of "waging
aggressive war", especially if it is codi-
fied. Efforts to define or to codify this
offense have not yet been successful.7 6
By contrast, Hague III, while subject
to improvement as indicated in this
paper, defines, forbids and as part of
the law of war provides an individual
penalty for surprise attack.
Why does the judgment not include
a direct finding of guilt of the separate
and independent crime of surprise at-
tack as defined and forbidden by
Hague III? The answer is that no
count in the indictment charged this
separate and independent crime; and
the court could not make a finding of
guilt of a crime not charged.
One of the proposed counts that
might have been based on Hague III,
using the words of the treaty law,
would have charged in substance that:
certain named defendants, Tojo, Shi-
mada. and others, on December 7,
1941, at Pearl Harbor, Territory of
Hawaii, unlawfully commenced liostili-
ties and war by Japan against the
United States, that is, the defendants,
by the armed forces of Japan, unIw-
fully bombed, shot, burned, wounded
and killed two thousand four hundred
and three (2403) nationals of the
United States, named in an attached
bill of particulars, and unlawfully
bombed, shot. burned and wounded an
70. Judgment, page 986.
71. Judgment, page 20.
72. Ibid, page 37. The statement by Fuku-
dome, op. cit, note 19, iupra, that these thirteen
murder counts were "dismissed" by the judg-
ment unfortunately is an exact contradiction of
the judgment.
72. The Court found twenty-three defendants
guilty of waging aggressive war, twenty-two
guilty of conspiracy to wage aggressive war,
seven guilty of failing to uphold observance of
the laws of war, and five guilty of ordering or
permitting atrocities against Prisoners of war.
74. Judgment, page 986.
75. Taft, Equal Justice Under Law; The
Heritage oj the English-Speaking Peoples and
Their Responsibility, conference at Kenyon
College (October, 1946) page 15. See Current,
SECETARY STIyMSO (1D54) page 218.
76. See Harris op. cit., 555, 560, passim 514
et seq.
77. Judgment, pages M5; 987: 1,144.
78. "The Hague Treaty Number II is nothing
but a bluff or simulacrum, and there is no need
to respect such a childish treaty at the out-
break of a war in which the fate of a nation
Is at stake."--Japanese document introduced at
additional one thousand one hundred
and seventy-eight (1178) nationals of
the United States, named in an attached
bill of particulars, and unlawfully
bombed, burned, sank and otherwise
damaged and destroyed ships, aircraft
and other property of the United States
and of its nationals, as described in an
attached bill of particulars, without first
having delivered to the United States
Government a previous, explicit, warn-
ing, reasoned declaration of war, or
an ultimatum with conditional declara-
tion of war, contrary to Hague Con-
vention iI of 1907 and other pro-
visions of the law of war and of
nations.
Why was such a count not included
in the indictment? One reason was the
need for brevity. Another reason was
an opinion of some draftsmen of the
indictment that this charge of violat-
ing Hague III was in fact included as
a basic part of other counts. 77 The
legal adequacy of Hague III alone to
support a separate count was not qucs-
tioned by the lawyer draftsmen of the
indictment, and as one of the drafts-
men I proposed the inclusion of such
a count, but I recognized the force of
the two reasons causing exclusion, as
stated above. The adequacy of such a
count might be questioned principally
bv writers not taking the viewpoint of
the criminal law.' 8
Difficulties and differences regarding
statements of law and sentences in the
judgment existed among members of
the court, as shown by the fact that
three of the eleven judges filed exten-
sive dissenting opinions. Their difficul-
ties do not require discussion here.
The record offers useful experience for
organizing a system for selection of
judges for joint courts in the future.
trial. See Robinson, paper at The Hague (1948),
note 43, supra, quoting other attacks on Hague
II. The treaty has been attacked by some inter-
national law professors and text-writers. Pro-
fessors Holland and Westlake in 1906 aggres-
sively opposed the original proposal and draft
at Ghent. ANNUAIE DE L'INsTITUT Ds Doir
tNTERNAnONAL, 1906, 272, 275, 279, 283, 285, 286,
292. Professor Renault, however, was a prin-
cipal proponent of the treaty. For a recent
criticism see McDougal and Feliciano, Initiation
of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analyis, 52
AmE. JoUn. TNTERNATcONAL LAw 241 (1958) at
page 257, note 37: "The Convention [Hague III]
is pointless insofar as the prevention of surprise
attacks is concerned; for the period of timo
between the communication of the declaration
or ultimatum and the beginning of hostilities
was left undetermined, such that even an in-
finitesimal space of time would apparently sat-
isfy the requirement of 'previous warning' 11.
Citing Professors Hall and Westlake. But com-
pare page 976, 977, above. The contrast between
these general analyses and the criminal law
analysis presented in this paper illustrates the
difference in approach which this writer seeks
to emphasize.
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The judgment represents progress in
the development of the law against
surprise attack. It marks progress also
toward the organization by many na-
tions of joint judicial methods to
strengthen their public security and
to establish peace under law.
The Peace Palace at The Hague
bears an inscription, Pacis tutela apud
judicen The safeguarding of peace
is in the hands of the judge. Hague
III, as a law designed to safeguard
peace, may be considered, under all
the circumstances and on the whole
rccord from indictment to judgment,
to have been in worthy judicial hands
in the court at Tokyo.
VI
The Public Interest Served by
Hague III and the Tokyo Trial
The Third Hague Convention of
1907 is useful as a criminal law which
defines and forbids the crime of sur-
prise attack. In this treaty the govern-
ments and peoples of forty-seven na-
tions have united their public force in
an alliance binding themselves not to
make surprise attack against one an-
other. More than fifty years have now
passed since Russia led the other na-
tions at Gient and The Hague in draft-
ing and enacting this law.
In the course of the half-century
forty-four of the treaty nations have
obeyed this law. Three of the treaty
nations, Germany, Japan and the
Soviet Union, have violated this law.70
Eleven of the nations have been the
victims of these violations, and eight of
these victims have been small states.
Three of the small state victims, Bel-
gium, Luxembourg and Poland, have
suffered two surprise attacks.
Hague III today is the chief specific
weapon of the law against surprise at-
tack. The treaty meets the require-
ments of sound criminal law as de-
clared two centuries ago by Blackstone,
-principles particularly sound for an
international criminal statute:
The criminal law should be founded
upon principles that are permanent,
uniform and universal; and always
conformable to the dictates of truth
and justice, the feelings of humanity
and the indelible rights of mankind. S0
Although the treaty is both useful
U. aarmy migna uurpa
Hideki Tojo, former General, Premier and War Minister, in the witness
box testifying in his own behalf before the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East.
and sound, the question remains: why
has it failed to prevent serious sur-
prise attacks? Specifically, why did
the Japanese violate Hague III at
Pearl Harbor?
At the Tokyo trial the Japanese de-
fense alleged reasons for the violation.
One reason might be called a plea of
confession and avoidance; that they
had tried to deliver a declaration of
war and that the so-called "declara-
tion" was delayed by an alleged "acci-
dent" apparently suspected by Togo to
have been deliberately planned. 8' The
trial brought out conclusive reasons
for rejecting this plea, as shown above.
Military necessity was another ex-
cuse given by certain Japanese for dis-
regard of the treaty.8 2 A plea of mili-
tary necessity, as Hershey declares, is
"a monstrous doctrine" leading to "in-
ternational anarchy and is the nega-
tion of law. .. ,,s
The force of circumstances was sug-
gested as a defense. This reasoning
was based on the premises that Japan
was menaced by subversion by inter-
national Communism, as shown in part
by the Sorg6 spy case; that Japan was
menaced internally by military and
civil disorders and economic suffering
resulting from the world-wide depres-
sion of the early 1930's; that the
political parties and constitutional gov-
ernment were not meeting this crisis;
that Japan's policy in China was neces-
sary for self-defense but that the
United States was blocking this policy;
and that Japan feared American naval
expansion in the Pacific. This reason-
ing shows a necessity that nations
unite in an effective system of orga-
nized justice in order to protect each
other: first, from indirect subversion
as well as direct aggression; second,
from military dictators using the peo-
pie's economic distress to get power;s1
79. See notes 47 and 50.
80. 4 Blackstone, COMMENTaaES (1769) 2.
See additional qualities of soundness as stated
by Holmes, TaE Commo N LAW (1881) 41, 49,
213: the treaty deals with "instincts" and
"demands" of the people, and with "conditions
of things manifest to the senses".
81. See Togo, op. cit., pages 198, 208-222.
82. Fukudome, op. cit., page 1,323-
83. Hershey, op. cit., page 234 n.
84. Former Secretary Dulles pointed out that
it was "the economic condition that bought
Hitler and the Japanese war lords into power in
the early 1930's". He suggests that serious in-
terruption of international trade could likewise
"precipitate World War III", unless peace is
institutionalized "through processes of law and
justice and enforcement thereof". Dulles, The
institutionalizing of Peace, PROCEEIms AMER.
Soev. INTERNATIONAL LAW, April, 1956, page 11.
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and third, fros groundless as distin-
guished from reasonable fears of sur-
prise attack. The reasoning presents no
legal defense, however, for stepping
across the line drawn by Hague III
and killing innocent peaceful human
victims and making war on their na-
tions without first having made the
five-point declaration of war.
In fact. a dominant reason for the
Japanese violation of Hague III at
Pearl Harbor may be considered to
have been the circumstance that no
court had ever been set up to punish
violators of the treaty. Defendants ap-
parently decided to take the risk that
no court would be set up to try them if
they should violate Hague III and
should lose the war. Their ally Hitler
had recently been following the same
reasoning, as he pointed out to them.6 5
The basis of this reasoning must be
recognized if law is to remove that
basis.
The people of the forty-four nations
that have not violated Hague III may
well ask themselves the question: Why
did it take thirty-nine years, seventeen
violations of Hague III by three at-
tacking nations against eleven victim
nations, and two world wars com-
mcnccd by violations of Hague III,
before eleven nations activated the
treaty by setting up a court?
A further question for all the na-
tions that arc parties to the treaty is
this: Why, during the eleven years that
have passed since the Tokyo trial, have
the treaty nations taken no steps to
provide for courts and otherwise to
strengthen Hague Ill and related pub-
lic secirity laws?
A great service of Hague III may
be that it exemplifies so forcibly the
fact that treaties and other laws, as
Hamilton said, "are dead letters with-
out courts",8s But it shows also that
with a court the treaty can perform an
indispensable function.
An alternate member of the Inter-
national Tribunal at Nuremberg, the
late lamented Judge John J. Parker.
wrote just before his death in March,
1958, that
... much bitter controversy would have
been avoided and the results would
have been more readily acceptable,
certainly by the conquered nations, and
possibly by the world at large, if the
courts which conducted the trials had
been set up by an existing interna-
tional institution such as the Inter.
national Court of JustLice. 7
There are several reasons for failure
of the nations to establish a treaty
court system, either in the thirty-nine
years before the Tokyo court began to
function or in the eleven years since it
ceased to function. One reason, espe-
cially in the past eleven years, has been
emergency pressures. Day-to-day emer-
gencies and crises in international re-
lations have interfered with the long-
range planning necessary for strength-
ening the law against surprise attack. 8
Another reason has been the absence
of any fixed responsibility for strength-
ening or, when necessary, enforcing,
ti treaty law.
A final reason for the neglect of
Hague III and other public security
laws has been the shortage of experi.
enced personnel to do the necessary
planting, drafting and liaison work.
In particular, lawyers and judges of
the United States and of other nations,
especially those with experience in
criminal law practice and adjudication,
have not yet been mobilized for this
service.s They have not yet had op-
portunity Lu assume constructive re-
sponsibilities in this field. The people
of the United States, as Professor
William E. Hocking and Editor Henry
R. Luce respectively have pointed out,
have been "timorous and unenterpris-
ing" in not using law as the "most
effective and the most necessary means"
for peaceS 0 The people realize the
necessity for using specialists and re-
searchers in nuclear science; but they
do not yet appear to realize the equal
85. Judgment, pages 1,140-1,141; 1,188. See
Harris op. cit., ch. 13, Alliance for Aggression,
pages 158-171.
86. Hamilton, THE FEDERALISI, No- 22 (1787).
See also Dulles, International Law and Individ-
uals 35 A.B.A.J. 912 (1949); and WAR AN
PEACE 201-204.
87. Parker, We Must Go Forward: Law in the
World Community, address prepared for U.N.
League of Lawyers, March 18, 1958. CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD, April 1, 1958; 44 AB.A.J. 641
at 643 (1958).
88. See Bowie, Analpsis of Our Policy
Machine, New Yonx TIMES MACAZInE, March 9,
1958. The writer of this paper has received
the same explanation from numerous depend-
able sources in two principal countries. See
also Fenwick, The Legal Aspects of N~eutralism.
51 AmEs. Joca. INT. LAW 71 (January, 1957).
89 See Luce, Our Great Hope: Peace Is the
Work of Justice, 43 A.B.A.J. 407 (1957),
90. See Luce, op. cit.; see also Rhyne, World
Peace Through Law, President's Address, and
see White, BERNARD BARUCH: PORTRAIT Or A CIT-
IZEN (1950) 134, 198. 44 A.B.A.J. 937 (1958).
91. See, for related proposals: Taft, A FOR-
EIGN POLICY FOR AMERICANS, cited with approval
necessity for using experienced lawyer
specialists and researchers in criminal
law and court organization for effective
nuclear controls.
What action is appropriate for end-
ing failures by the nations to strength-
en and to enforce Hague III?
The improvement of the treaty
should be effected as a part of a pre-
cise and comprehensive criminal law
plan and codification. It can not be
effected as merely one political detail
in a broad general plan for world
peace. In order to make Hague III
and related national security treaties
effective, they must be fitted into a
concise and simple system of criminal
law having the three usual and neces-
sary parts, namely, (1) a code of of.
fenses and of procedure, (2) an organ-
ization for courts, and (3) a system of
police or of other organized enforce-
ment 91 . A modernized redraft of
Hague III alone, or a single permanent
international criminal court, or minor
amendments of the present Inter-
national Court of Justice would be
inadequate.9 2
A first step, so far as the United
States is concerned, appears to be
legislation by Congress to provide for
a national commission or an advisory
committee or both. The legislation
could be patterned or based in part
upon the new law for a commission
and advisory committee on interna-
tional rules of judicial procedure. 9t
The commission could well include
members or former members of the
diplomatic service, of the Armed Serv-
ices, and of the Congress, and other
national leaders, and specialists in in-
ternational law and organization. The
by Dulles, The Challenge of Our Time: Peace
with Justice, 39 A.B.A.J. 106 at 1066 (Decem-
ber, 1953) : Parker, op. cit.; Dulles, The Insti-
tutionalizing of Peace, op. ci., page 13: Roose-
velt, Theodore, letter of Noverber 28, 1914,
reprinted in Noyes, Two WORLDS roR MEMORY
(1953) 111. See also Hamilton, TuE FEDERALIST
No. 22 (1787); ace also Scott, JUDICIAL SETTLE-
MENm' UF CuaIaOVEsiEs BETWEEN STATES OF THE
AM'ERICAN UNION (1919) 2-13; 537-43. For re-
lated suggestions see Winters, editorial, The
Federal Judieiarpy-A Model for World Court
Organization, 28 JOaNAL OF THE AnEsscAa
JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 67 (October, 1944). Warren,
The Law and the Future, FORTUNE (November,
1955).
92. United Nations General Assembly by
Resolution of December 12, 1950, established a
committee on international criminal jurisdic-
tion, which took extensive action. The Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1952 and 1953 debated
the committee's proposed statute for a court.
The project was not approved. See Appleman,
MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
(1954) pages 363-372.
93. Public Law 85-906 (85th Cong. 2d Sess.
H.R. 4642).
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advisory committee to advise the Com-
mission and the Congress, could be a
technical committee of lawyers for re-
search, drafting, conference and liaison
with American and foreign lawyers,
similar to the United States Supreme
Court's former advisory committees on
the Federal Rules of Criminal and of
Civil Procedure.
The President of the United States
has asserted objectives regarding sur-
prise attack. His words may be used
to summarize the usefulness of Hague
Ill and the Tokyo trial. The President,
speaking to the press at Washington
on August 7, 1957, said
If you can relieve the world of the
great fear of surprise, devastating at-
tack, then disarmament will follow
step by step almost automatically...
The essential thing is to get people
working together for a peaceful pur-
pose, trying to solve administrative or
technical problems; then some kind of
confidence could be established. 94
The "great fear of surprise . . . at-
tack" has been based since 1941 largely
on the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.
If the Pearl Harbor attackers, like all
previous surprise attackers, had been
permitted to escape without having
been made to answer to the law, the
fear of the people would again have
been aggravated by feelings of injus-
tice, of helplessness and of despair.0 5
By contrast, the trial and punishment
of Japanese militarist-political leaders
who caused that attack to be made have
served to reduce that fear. Many people
of many nations, moreover, by "work-
ing together" at The Hague and at
Tokyo have shown that joint criminal
laws and courts can and will bring law
and order into this heretofore lawless
jungle area of international life. Shall
this progress be continued?
On Capitol Hill in Washington, the
United States Supreme Court Building
bears apt witness to a principle, to a
technique and to a warning. These
three testimonies, by due application,
could end the world's fear and danger
of nuclear surprise attack.
The principle stands out in the letters
cut in white marble above the columns
at the entrance of the building, Equal
Justice Under Law. To make this an-
cient ideal principle effective as an
international, universal principle of
law and justice and peace, the nations
and peoples need to join in equal legal
partnership:
In drafting a brief code or penal sec-
tions of public security treaties;
In establishing a joint judiciary or-
ganization for providing courts and
possibly arbitration commissions as
needed to interpret and to apply the
treaties; and
In organizing joint enforcement serv-
ices and the common legal agencies and
procedural devices, such as surety de-
posits and restraining orders, to uphold
the courts and the treaties.9 6
The technique is the next testimony
given by the Supreme Court Building.
From the building's massive bronze
entrance doors the colonnaded corridor
leads to two large conference rooms.
Here lawyers and judges, as advisory
committees under the authority and the
direction of the Court and of the Con-
gress, have applied the technique of re-
search-and-conference on a nation-wide
scale in organizing more efficiently the
administration of "equal justice under
law".
By a similar technique, lawyers in
the United States, in each participating
nation, and in the United Nations can
give practical leadership on a world-
wide scale in organizing more efficiently
the administration of Hague III and
other public security treaty laws.
The related technique of a court in
action is to be seen in the nearby court-
room of the Supreme Court. Here jus-
tice under law is organized in a public
agency to provide an impartial hear-
ing, a dependable determination of
appropriate facts and a responsible
equal application of equal law. The
international court in Tokyo, unlike
this permanent high court of appeal,
was an ad hoe criminal trial court.
Nevertheless, judicial principles, ideals
and even techniques hold much in com-
mon in all courts of justice whatever
94. President Eisenhower, statement to the
press, Washington, August 7, 1957. TaE TIMES
(London, August 8, 1957) page 5, column 5.
95. See Noyes, Tts EDsa oF TaE AsYss (1943)
65-70, and Two WomnDs roR MEsrony (1953)
111, 296; Charpentier, OU VA LA JUSTICE? Op.
cit., 47, 56; Brierly, ToE OUTLOOK FOn INTa-
nATIONAL LAw (1944) 50: "The defeatist policy
is accepted in international law alone." Church-
ill wrote in 1948 that World War II would have
been "easy to stop" by "enforcement at any
time till 1914 of the Disarmament Clauses" of
the World War I peace treaty. Churchill, THE
QATHING STORs (1948) IV, 16.
96. The need and the present opportunity for
and wherever they may be. It is a
truism that equal justice knows no
single court nor country, no single race,
religion, language, person, party, place
nor time. Nor does any legal system
have a monopoly of justice. At Tokyo,
we lawyers of the Western nations, of
Russia and of Japan recognized that
the development of rival systems of
justice may be a decisive international
competition of the future; but that,
with leadership, the competition might
lead toward a composite allied legal
order under treaty controls.
The warning is the third and final
testimony given by the building. In its
halls and rooms the building displays
Air Raid Defense notices setting forth
the alarm siren warning for surprise
attack.
If and when the surprise attack warn-
ing signal-the long wailing blasts of
the hundreds of air raid sirens-is rais-
ing the alarm on Capitol Hill, the Su-
preme Court Building may be near
nuclear dissolution into clouds and
ashes. Many other courthouses, the lo-
cal operating bases of organized justice
throughout the world, may then like-
wise be nearing nuclear dissolution.
And this devastation would come large-
ly because organized justice stops, but
organized surprise attackers and their
modern missiles do riot stop, at legal-
istic pre-atomic boundary lines separat-
ing the nations.
If, on the other hand, the surprise
attack warning signal is never heard
on Capitol Hill or elsewhere, that result
will doubtless be due largely to lawyers
of the United States and their lawyer
brethren throughout the world. Law-
yers making competent use of prece-
dents such as Hague III and the Tokyo
trial will have organized law and order
not only against surprise attack but
also for the wider rule of law demanded
by the modern atomic and space era.
"equal legal partnership" between the older
nations and the newer nations, in respect both
to rights and to duties, is stressed by: Lure,
op. cit., page 408, "Justice is the operative word
among these new nations"; by Marsh, secretary-
general, International Commission of Jurists,
NEWSLETTER, June, 1958, page 2, pointing out
strong feeling in new Asian countries of neg-
lect by the older countries in legal problems;
and by Churchill in his Guildhall address, July
31, 43 A.B.A.J. (October, 1957) 914, saying,
"Justice knows no frontiers", but "Justice can-
not be a hit-or-miss system", and international
laws must be obeyed by all nations equally,
with particular reference to nations participat-
ing in the United Nations.
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